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Abstract 
This research examines the pricing tool reverse auctioning. In a reverse auction 
buyer's state the item they wish to buy and the sellers compete with each other for the 
sale, driving the price steadily down until no seller is willing to go any lower. Darleen A. 
Druyun, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and 
Management, Washington, D.C., launched the Air Force acquisition reform "Lightning 
Bolts" initiatives. These initiatives jump-start acquisition reform to find processes 
leading towards a better, faster, and cheaper way of conducting business. A reverse 
auction is one of these processes. A review of the extant literature shows that reverse 
auctioning has been utilized in the commercial sector since 1994, covering thousands of 
types of items. 
Preliminary research explored the appropriateness of reverse auctioning in 
Information Technology. Recent studies indicate the use of reverse auctioning should be 
expanded beyond Information Technobgy. Air Force acquisition professionals have 
utilized reverse auctioning as the pricing technique for twenty procurements, nearly all 
for the procurement of low price Information Technology. This research will assist 
acquisition professionals in better understanding the challenges related to the use of the 
reverse auction beyond low price Information Technology. 
HOW CAN THE AIR FORCE MAXIMIZE THE VALUE OF 
REVERSE AUCTIONING AS A PRICING TECHNIQUE? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Background 
More than twenty Fortune 500 companies have used reverse auctions since 1994. 
These include Caterpillar, Procter & Gamble, United Technologies and Zenith (Rafter, 
98). Additionally, the Department of Defense (DOD) has used reverse auctions since 
May 2000 (NAVICP, 2000). DOD has completed several successful implementations of 
the reverse auction process focusing primarily on procuring low cost, Information 
Technology (IT) items. Reverse auctioning is an acquisition reform initiative that is of 
great potential value to the acquisition workforce due to the current acquisition 
environment highlighted by workforce reductions and budget constraints. This thesis 
describes the potential to expand the use of reverse auctions beyond the procurement of 
low cost IT products. 
The Acquisition Environment 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and the Clinger- 
Cohen Act of 1996 are enabling the DOD to find ways to reduce costs and to simplify 
processes. The FASA focuses on (1) reducing unique purchasing requirements; (2) 
increasing the use of simplified acquisition procedures; and (3) obtaining goods and 
services faster while reducing in-house procedures. The Information Technology 
Management Reform Act (ITMRA) and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) 
together are known as the Clinger-Cohen Act and further advance the changes made by 
FAS A. The Clinger-Cohen Act provides opportunities for the DOD to further streamline 
and reduce non-value added steps in the acquisition process. The FARA mandates 
compliance with 41 U.S.C. 404, which states that government-wide procurement policies, 
regulations, and procedures should promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in 
procurements made by the executive branch of the federal government (41 U.S.C. 404). 
This mandate has led the DOD to use this reverse auction pricing technique, although in a 
very limited manner. 
Purpose and Objective of Research 
This research identifies and examines the factors for establishing and 
implementing the reverse auctioning pricing technique. The objective is to determine 
whether this pricing technique's use may be broadened and to provide guidance for its 
expansion. Additionally, guidance will be developed to assist procurement professionals 
in determining if a reverse auction is appropriate for a given procurement action. 
Methodology 
To accomplish the objectives stated above, this research uses a qualitative, 
comparative analysis case study. The case studies consist of an examination of 
contractual documents and interviews with the personnel that conducted four reverse 
auctions. The data was analyzed to find themes and patterns that occurred during the 
reverse auctions. The theoretical content of the research was established through 
literature review, examining the possible expanded use of this tool A comparative 
analysis was conducted to examine the strength of the explanation provided by the 
findings and to determine the validity of the research. 
Summary 
The Air Force and commercial companies have implemented reverse auctioning 
as a pricing tool for many types of acquisitions. Due to the mandate to promote 
efficiency and effectiveness in procurements, this research examines reverse auctioning 
to determine if further use of the technique is feasible. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Definition of Reverse Auction 
Harris defines reverse auctions as a twist on the more familiar "forward" auction, 
in which interested buyers bid against one another for an item until the one willing to pay 
the highest price is left standing (Harris, 01). In a reverse auction, a single buyer solicits 
bids from multiple suppliers of a product. Those suppliers then bid the price down until 
the one willing to sale at the lowest price remains (Harris, 01). Merson defines a reverse 
auction as the opposite of a traditional auction (Merson, 00). In a traditional auction, a 
seller offers an item or items for sale while potential buyers compete with each other for 
the purchase, driving the price steadily up until no buyer will bid any higher. In a reverse 
auction, multiple sellers of products vie for the business of a single buyer, thereby driving 
the price down. Bidding continues until a pre-established bidding period ends or until no 
seller will bid any lower (Merson, 00). 
A news release from Randolph Air Force Base, the Air Force Personnel Center, 
describes reverse auctioning, also known as online auctioning, as different from the 
standard Air Force procurement practice. Reverse auctioning allows the bidders to see 
their competitors' bids, while concealing the company's identity. Reverse auctioning 
allows bidders to actively compete through submission of multiple price proposals. 
History of Commercial Use 
Commercial businesses have used reverse auctions since 1994 (Rafter, 98). With 
the increased use of the Internet, information technology enables companies to host 
internet-based reverse auctions. This use of information technology allows businesses to 
save time and money in conducting reverse auctions. Reverse auction service providers 
put billions of dollars in products and services on the auction block creating huge savings 
for commercial companies (Jap, 00). In 1998, reverse auction provider Freemarkets 
Online accumulated more than 20 Fortune 500 companies as customers with more than 
1,000 suppliers taking part in the reverse auctions. These reverse auctions allowed 
customers to save an average of 17 percent (Rafter, 98). 
Commercial Application 
EDS Canada (one of the largest professional IT firms in Canada) used a reverse 
auction for a large contract labor buy. They had 20 different technical contract labor 
suppliers and wanted to reduce this to a single primary supplier and one backup quickly. 
Their solution consisted of issuing a Request For Proposal (RFP) on 2 Feb 00 followed 
by an electronic reverse auction (Atkinson, 00). 
The RFP contained a request for information on 30 different job descriptions for 
three different regions of the country, and a breakdown for two different classifications, 
including an hourly rate and a markup rate. The company initially focused on qualitative 
information rather than price. They made this clear to potential vendors by stating that 
only qualitative parameters would be considered to make the potential reverse auction 
players list, the "short list" (Atkinson, 00). 
EDS Canada sent out 35 RFPs and received 22 responses. The company short- 
listed this to six within one week after receiving the supplier responses. Ranking and 
weighing qualitative parameters such as value-added services stated in the RFP 
accomplished this. The six finalists received training on the auctioning process and were 
reminded their bids were considered along with the qualitative information (Atkinson, 
00). 
Next, a practice run reverse auction allowed suppliers the opportunity to see if 
their technology worked and let them become comfortable with the reverse auction 
process.   During the practice reverse auction, the Local Area Network (LAN) crashed. 
This did not result in a catastrophic failure of the process since safeguards were put in 
place (Atkinson, 00). 
These safeguards included: 
a. A back-up LAN and internet service; 
b. Cellular phones, in case the phone line becomes unavailable; 
c. A backup computer, allowing the provider to act on behalf of the 
supplier; 
A directed message system was developed: 
a. In case of an inappropriate bid a directed message can be sent to the 
supplier. 
b. To ensure suppliers were not experiencing technical complications. 
The reverse auction was set for two hours, with four 15-minute extensions. The 
reverse auction received 996 bids from the six suppliers during the three-hour period. 
EDS Canada then short-listed to two suppliers based on the reverse auction bid, in-person 
presentations conducted the week following the reverse auction, and qualitative factors. 
They selected a primary supplier and a substitute, awarding both with two-year contracts. 
The process took approximately two months versus a historical six-month process for a 
similar procurement (Atkinson, 00). 
Commercial enterprise does not limit the use of reverse auctioning to a specific 
type of acquisition. Many commercial companies today use online reverse auctions to 
procure everything from raw materials and transportation services to engineered parts, 
springs, molded plastics, and stampings (Jap 00). Market research from major 
corporations indicates reverse auctioning has a long-term place in their e-Business 
strategy. Hence, many corporations are negotiating substantial long-term contracts with 
reverse auction service providers (Snyder, 00). 
Government Applications 
"Lightning Bolts" tasked the Air Force's acquisition personnel to find processes 
that lead towards a better, faster, and cheaper way of conducting business. Building a 
21st century military capable of meeting the 21st century mission, requires an acquisition 
system that provides the United States Air Force with the highest quality goods in the 
most affordable and efficient manner possible. This reengineered acquisition system 
focuses on managing suppliers, rather than supplies (Dickey, 01). 
Prior to 1997, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) prohibited the use of 
reverse auctioning by government personnel. Upon review, the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy (OFPP) determined this prohibition was not in the government's best 
interest. The OFPP officials lifted the ban in the FAR and gave government procurement 
officials a chance to achieve the private sector's success. In 1997, the FAR rewrite 
allowed government agencies to consider reverse auctions (Harris, 2001). 
The military services rapidly adopted reverse auctioning in 2000. In February 
2001, SAF/AQC, signed a memorandum stating the concept of reverse auctions emerged 
as a potentially viable contract pricing tool. The memorandum encourages acquisition 
personnel to use reverse auctions in situations where it is appropriate. This approach 
allows the Air Force to gain insight into the appropriateness of reverse auctions for 
certain commodities and services (Scott, 2001). 
In 1999, Pennsylvania became the first state to test the on-line reverse auction 
process by implementing a pilot program with FreeMarkets, a reverse auction service 
provider. The pilot program included three reverse auctions to procure coiled aluminum, 
anthracite coal, and road salt. Pennsylvania's Department of General Services estimates 
saving taxpayers $3.7 million through the use of the reverse auction pilot program. The 
pilot program was expanded to include commodity purchases in which savings of $ 11 
million are estimated (Ritchie, 1999). 
In 2000, the United States Postal Service was the first federal agency to undertake 
the reverse auction process (Matthews, 00).   They first bought envelopes and then leased 
5,000 trucks through reverse auctions. This reduced their truck leasing costs by 12.5 
percent while upgrading the quality of their truck fleet in the process (Harris, 01). 
The Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) conducted their first reverse 
auction on 5 May 2000 to procure recovery sequencers that are described as the brains of 
the Advanced Concept Ejection Seat for the B-1 bomber and F-15, F-16, and F-117 
fighter aircraft. Offers were received from three potential suppliers and the Navy 
estimates achieved reductions of 28.9 percent (nearly $1 million) (Hicks, 00). The 
NAVSUP continues using reverse auctions and finds a main benefit is they can make a 
contract award within an hour of the reverse auction. This compares with several weeks 
in the standard procurement process (Seffers, 00). Table 1 summarizes five reverse 
auctions conducted by NAVSUP with reported savings of $14.8M. 
NAVSUP: Completed Reverse Auctions 
Item Evaluation Criteria Date Reported Savings 
Recovery 




Acceptable/Low Price 30-Jun-00 $2.8Mor22% 
T-56 Engine 
Blades Price Only 3-Aug-00 $1.2Mor17% 
Mobile MRI 
Services Best Value 18-Aug-00 
Award to other than 
the low, no savings. 
CVN Camels Best Value 7-Sep-00 $9.9M or 27% 
Table 1 Source:  NAVSUP handout, 
FAI/DAU Reverse Auction Lunchtime Seminar, October 3, 2000 
The Air Force conducted their first three reverse auctions on 3 Aug 00 to purchase 
computer equipment. The three auctions resulted in estimated savings of 27% or $88K. 
Continuing success with the procurement of Information Technology (IT) was found as 
one auction provided savings of $60,200 or 23% below the General Services 
Administration (GSA) schedule price and included an option to increase the order 
quantity by 15% after the auction. These IT reverse auctions lasted approximately 35 
minutes each with awards placed with the lowest bidder (Seffers, 00). 
The III Corps and Fort Hood Contracting Command conducted the Army Forces 
Command's first reverse auction. They estimate a 10.67% price reduction under the 
estimated product price and a significant increase in quality. The requirement was for 
forty Pentium III computers with peripheral computer equipment. All requirements were 
met or exceeded with four GSA small business vendors participating in the process. The 
four vendors were selected through market research on existing GSA schedule holders 
who supply computer equipment. Fort Hood spent approximately six days preparing for 
the auction and the delivery order was signed the same day the auction was completed. 
Fort Hood is satisfied with the auction process and has plans for expanding its use 
(Calderon, 01). 
The Air Force has taken the first steps toward securing reverse auction enabling 
services. The Air Force partnered with the Army's Communications-Electronics 
Command and entered into a licensing agreement with Frictionless, a reverse auction 
service provider, through the end of December 2001. This agreement allowed Air Force 
offices to use Frictionless software for conducting reverse auctions (AF Acquisition 
Newsletter, 2001). As of 1 January 2002 each Air Force office must obtain funding and 
select the reverse auction service provider of their choice. 
Long-term Considerations 
Cost reductions are noted in many reverse auctions but there is a need to look at 
the long-term effect. Some suppliers are able to sustain a sharp price reduction for only a 
short period of time. Initially, buyers experience reduced prices when they run a reverse 
auction. These savings reduce the supplier companies' profits. Over the long term, 
suppliers may not be able to compete at the lower price levels and may eventually be 
forced to consolidate or leave the industry. In the end, buyers may lose the advantage of 
the reverse auction and the bargaining power will shift to suppliers (Jap, 00). 
Buyers can obtain costs reductions but still must consider the defense industrial 
base before conducting a reverse auction. The United States' industrial supplier base is 
shifting. As the Department Of Defense reduces spending, the defense industrial base 
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shrinks (Washington, 99). Reverse auctioning may further reduce the defense industrial 
base. 
Researching the Market 
Prior to implementing a reverse auction, market analysis must be accomplished to 
gather, organize, and analyze data and practices in the particular market segment. 
Advance preparation is important and must focus more upon the market than the product 
or service. The characteristics of a market in which the reverse auction may be 
successful follows: 
•    At least two competent, competitive suppliers. 
• A clearly defined requirement each competitor finds attractive. 
• Management support for changing suppliers. 
Market Research must evaluate if the market warrants a reverse auction and then 
determine if suppliers would be willing to participate. All acquis ition strategies are based 
on the type of capability being procured, and the type of purchasing relationship depends 






Criticals are the items central to the firm's distinctive technical capability and are 
crucial to the buyer's profit margin. The loss, absence, or delay of receipt of these items 
may force the organization out of business. A critical item is not readily available in the 
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marketplace. It often has limited sources, subject to the complexities and uncertainties of 
the environment. This is the most sophisticated partnering relationship, focused on 
customer value. Due to the need for a sophisticated partnering relationship and the 
availability of limited sources, these high values, high-risk items may not be a viable 
candidate for a reverse auction. 
Commodities are the products or services, which are part of the high value items 
that the firm needs to stay in business. They are similar to critical items but are readily 
available in the marketplace. A low risk must be weighed against the high value to the 
business. Reverse auctions may be viable for low risk, high value commodities. 
Generics are the items that the firm needs to do business. They are readily 
available in the marketplace and have little or no distinctive qualities. There is little risk 
associated with the procurement of these items and not much value to be gained by 
distinguishing one from another. Firms try and minimize the time spent acquiring these 
products through elimination, outsourcing, or long-term re-supply contracts. These low 
values, low risk items are readily available in the marketplace and may be candidates for 
a reverse auction. 
Distinctives are products that are over specified. They offer no real value to the 
firm but create risk due to their high costs and their unavailability in the marketplace. 
They are a bottleneck in the supply chain. Firms should look at distinctive items to see if 
they can be eliminated and replaced with an item readily available in the marketplace. 
By plotting requirements against concepts of value and risk, an organization can 
effectively make a strategic purchasing decision. Figure 1 illustrates the classification of 





• Strategies: Key suppliers; 
design to customer or supplier 
specifications; provide 
product/market differentiation 
• Critical factors: 
Manufacturing costs high 
when cost and/or quality 
problems occur; difficult to 
source 
• Time horizon: Variable 
• Management approach: 
Simultaneous engineering and 
some "Supplier Partnerships" 
• Methods: Reduce number of 
products and suppliers 
• Agreement: Sole Source 
Contract 
• Tactics:  Decrease uniqueness 
of products unless 
competitive advantage is 
gained 
Criticals 
• Strategies: Strategic Supplier 
Partnerships; design to 
customer or supplier 
specifications; provide 
product/market differentiation 
• Critical factors: Manufacturing 
costs high when cost and/or 
quality problems occur; very 
difficult to source 
• Time horizon: Ten or more years 
• Management approach: Supplier 
Partnerships 
• Methods: Reduce number of 
suppliers 
• Agreement: Contract or Long- 
Term Agreement 





• Critical factors: Cost of 
acquisition 
• Time horizon: Up to one year 
• Management approach: 
Systems contracts; blanket 
orders 
• Methods: Reduce number of 
buys 
• Agreement: Purchase Order 
or credit card 
• Tactics: Increase use of 
technology 
Commodities 
• Strategies: Leverage spend; 
preferred suppliers 
• Critical factors: Cost of materials 
• Time horizon: Five or more years 
• Management approach: Volume 
contracting, and some Supplier 
Partnerships 
• Methods: Reduce number of 
suppliers 
• Agreement: Purchase Order or 
Long-Term Agreement 
• Tactics: Increase business 
volume with fewer suppliers 
Low -Value (cost, service, innovation). High 
Figure 1: Typology of Capabilities Acquired (Kraljic, 1983) 
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Supplier-Buyer Relationships 
A study was conducted on the results of six auctions conducted in which goods 
worth a half-billion dollars changed hands (Jap, 00). The study showed the reverse 
auction process tended to undermine the buyer-supplier relationship. Sellers felt 
exploited by the process and were less trusting of the buyer. Suppliers stated the reverse 
auctions took away a mutually beneficial supplier-buyer relationship. Suppliers worked 
hard to achieve and maintain a good relationship with the buyers and felt it was not fair to 
compete for a bid in the reverse auction environment. Reverse auctions may damage 
business relationships, ultimately eroding the economic performance of both buyer and 
supplier (Jap, 00). 
Before implementing strategic purchasing procedures, the organization needs to 
understand the various supplier relationships. Categories of the buyer-seller relationship 
follow (Cavinato, 92): 
1. Don't know supplier exists and don't care. 
2. Don't know supplier exists but might use them if they did know. 
3. Arm's length, price-oriented relationship: low value, low risk of obtaining in 
the marketplace, traditional (i.e. taxicab ride). 
4. Price relationship; cooperative from time to time (i.e., returning pallets to the 
supplier to reduce the price of the next shipment). 
5. Price relationship; collaborative over time (i.e., sharing demand forecasts with 
suppliers so they can level their manufacturing; helps reduce costs). 
6. Total cost relationship; cooperating on total supply chain to reduce total cost 
(i.e., providing performance rather than product specifications to supplier so 
they can reduce manufacturing costs). 
7. Value relationship; linking supplier to customers to emphasize product/service 
value. 
8. Joint ventures; complementary relationships uniting strong/weak attributes of 
companies. 
9. Vertical integration strategies: 
a) purchasing capital assets for suppliers; 
b) buying supplier and treating as a subsidiary; 
c) complete vertical integration of the capability. 
The first three relationships identified are based on an arm's length, lowest price 
14 
relationship. These items are currently considered good candidates for reverse auctions. 
Item numbers 4, 5, and 6 are expected to see cost reduction relationships associated with 
these items. Reverse auctioning may be a good candidate for the procurement of these 
items in the future. Items 7, 8, and 9 are not considered viable candidates for a reverse 
auction due to a more sophisticated buyer-seller relationship. 
Reverse Auction Service Providers (Merson, 2000) 
A service provider (enabler) is the company providing the reverse auction service. 
Many different companies offer reverse auction services.   It is important to select an 
enabler that best fills the agency's needs since the enablers provide a wide range of 
services, from making available software for implementing a reverse auction to providing 
full service. Full service providers have the capacity to fulfill the following: 
Provide market security, global connectivity, and network management; 
Conduct the auction with proven technology in real time without delays; 
Accommodate multiple bidding formats; 
Extend the auction when active bidding makes it appropriate; 
Provide recovery procedures in the event of technical difficulties; 
Provide relevant special terms and conditions; 
Provide expert advice on bundling strategies, bid formats, and other 
requirements to promote competition; and 
Provide proactive support before, during, and after the bidding process. 
Most agencies do not have the technical expertise to conduct their own reverse auction 
and rely on a full service enabler. Other criteria that organizations should consider prior 
to selecting an enabler are as follows: 
The track record of the enabler; 
Enabler's knowledge of the market; 
The technology used and its flexibility; 
Contingency plan for technical or other difficulties; 
Training plan for indoctrinating buyers and sellers; 
The ability to use other factors besides price in the process; 
The ability to work within FAR requirements; 
The type of business arrangements required; and 
The method and cost of the enabler's service. 
15 
In the Future 
Since September 11th, 2001, it is even more critical that procurement offices find 
savings and efficiencies that can provide every possible penny to apply to homeland 
defense and the first war of the twenty-first century. It is estimated that an across the 
board savings of 10 percent can be achieved buying computers, coal, copying, and 
janitorial services using the reverse auction process. This procurement tool could save 





There are five research strategies in the social sciences (Yin, 1994:4). Table 2 
provides an overview of the appropriate research methodology associated with each of 
these strategies. 
Strategy Form of Research 
Question 




Experiment How, why Yes No 
Survey Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much 
No Yes 
Archival Analysis Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much 
No Yes/No 
History How, why No No 
Case Study How, why No Yes 
Table 2. Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies (Yin 1994:6) 
The methodology used in this research is the case study. The research question is 
"How can the Air Force maximize the value of reverse auctioning as a pricing 
technique?" This question focuses on contemporary events and does not require control 
over behavioral events. 
Case Study Definition 
A case study allows for an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events (Yin, 1994:3). Case study uses direct observation and 
systematic interviewing to include a full variety of evidence such as documents, 
interviews, and observation (8). The central tendency of a case study is to illuminate a 
set of decisions: i.e. why a decision was taken, how it was implemented, and what were 
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the results (12). Case studies can be based on quantitative data, qualitative evidence, or a 
combination of the two (14). A case study investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within real- life context; even if the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly defined (1). 
Yin identifies five applications of the case study. The most important application 
is to help explain the causal links in real- life interventions that are too complex for a 
survey. A second application is to describe an intervention and the real- life context in 
which it occurred. The third application is to illustrate certain topics within an 
evaluation. The fourth application is to explore those situations in which the intervention 
being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes. The final application is meta- 
evaluation, which is a study of an evaluation study.   The constant theme in all 
applications is the program sponsor plays a prominent role in defining the evaluation 
questions and relevant data categories (Yin, 1994:15). 
Case Study Research Design 
There are four types of designs for case studies: single-case holistic designs, 
single-case embedded designs, multiple-case holistic designs, and multiple-case 




Holistic (single unit 
of analysis) 
Embedded 






Table 3. Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies (Yin, 1994:39) 
The design chosen for this research is multiple-case and embedded. A multiple- 
case study allows for the comparison of more than one case in predicting and/or 
producing results (Yin, 1994:45). The multiple-case study allows us to look at cases that 
will predict similar results or produce contrasting results for predictable reasons (46-47). 
An advantage of the multiple-case study is the evidence is often considered more 
compelling and regarded as being more robust than in the single case effort (45). This 
research uses the embedded approach in conducting analysis. The embedded design 
involves more than one unit or sub-unit of analysis (51). 
The following model serves as the basis for conducting this research analysis 
(Figure 2). In brief, all cases are developed separately which allows for a cross-case 
comparison and a final report of cross-case conclusions. 
Quality of the Research Design 
Validity and reliability measure the quality of a research design. Validity is the 
appropriateness, meaningfulness, and usefulness of the inferences made from the 
measures. Reliability is the degree to which the observed data is free from errors of 
measurement (Dooley, 2001:76). 
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Note: Dotted lines indicate discretionary process flow. 















These two factors are further broken down by Yin in three "tests" to ensure 
standards of quality are met. These tests measure internal validity, external validity, and 
reliability (Yin 1994:33). Internal validity occurs in the data analysis phase and is 
accomplished by using pattern matching. External validity is to determine if the research 
study's findings are generalizable beyond the immediate case study (35). To strengthen 
external validity of this research, three cases were studied and cross-case conclusions 
formulated, then a fourth case was compared to the findings of the cross-case analysis. 
The selection of reverse auctioning cases was by purposive sampling. In 
purposive sampling, the researcher chooses which cases to include as opposed to random 
sampling (Dooley, 1995:129). The entire population of Air Force reverse auctions is 
twenty. There were only four reverse auctions conducted to procure other than 
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Information Technology (IT). This research seeks to expand the use ofreverse 
auctioning past the procurement of IT; therefore, all four were selected to study in this 
research effort. However, the first three cases were compared to each other and the 
fourth case compared in contrast with conclusions of the first three. 
Documents and research questions are the two methods of data collection used in 
this study. The documentation is unobtrusive, exact, and has a long span of time (Yin 
1994: 80). Research questions were used to focus directly on reverse auctioning and to 
provide perceived causal inferences. 
A review was made of the applicable contract file information to obtain market 
research findings, potential or actual protests received, contract type, special contract 
clauses, and any other significant findings dealing with reverse auctioning. Follow-up 
calls may be needed to clarify information received during the data analysis period. To 
ensure accuracy of the researcher, after the case is written-up it will be sent to the 
respondent for review (Yin 1994: 92). 
Investigative Questions 
Three investigative areas were focused on in order to answer the research 
question, "How can the Air Force maximize the value of reverse auctioning as a pricing 
technique?" Each investigative question is restated with the question intent identified 
followed by a list of all questions asked in that area. 
Investigative Area 1 
What is the nature of the Department Of Defense (DOD) competitive market 
when using reverse auctioning? The intent of this question is to identify the 
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characteristics of a competitive market and determine what type of buyer-supplier 
relationship exists. 
1. How is the nature of the DOD competitive market affected by reverse 
auctioning? 
2. How does reverse auctioning affect the type of supplier relationship 
that is involved with the item being procured and what type of 
relationship is needed? 
3. How does reverse auctioning affect the DOD industrial base? 
4. How did you determine if your reverse auction was to be restricted and 
did you have any problems? 
Investigative Area 2 
Can the Air Force use reverse auctions for other than low price, information 
technology? The intent of this question is to determine what factors, other than low 
price, can be considered for award criteria of a reverse auction. 
5. What are the award criteria and why was it selected? 
Investigative Area 3 
What are the primary limitations of the reverse auction process? The intent of this 
question is to identify factors that limit the usefulness of a reverse auction. 
6. Did you develop any special contract clauses for your reverse auction, 
and, if so, what were they? 
7. How was the selection of the reverse auction service provider made? 
8. What were the primary limitations of the reverse auction process? 
Case Study Tactics 
Three tactics were used to collect the case study evidence. First, the use of 
multiple sources of evidence: documentation and interviews. Documentation was used 
to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources (Yin, 1994:81). Interviews were 
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conducted on an open-ended basis, to allow respondents to present facts and opinions 
about the case study (84). Second, a chain of evidence was established to increase the 
reliability of the information. This allows an external observer to trace the steps taken in 
these case studies and obtain the same results. Third, a key informant reviewed the draft 
case study report. In this research, the reviewers were the actual participants and 
informants of the case studies. Data was collected from multiple sources of evidence to 
facilitate convergent lines of inquiry; this insures the most accurate data for the research 
findings (92). 
Reliability assures if a later investigator follows the same procedures, the same 
findings will be concluded. "The goal of reliability is to minimize errors and biases in 
the study". Case study protocol and the development of a case study database are used to 
assure quality documentation during data analysis (Yin 1994, 63). 
Case study protocol is essential when using a multiple-case design. Protocol is 
intended to guide the researcher in carrying out the case study and is the major tactic in 
increasing the reliability of case study research. Protocol includes an overview of the 
case study project, field procedures, case study questions, and a guide for the case study 
report. Documenting and organizing all of the research information in a study database 
increases the reliability of the research (Yin 1994, 94). Protocol was used to establish the 
rules that were adhered to during this research. To assure each case study participant was 
informed of the same information, the researcher used an e-mail that was sent to all 
participants for initial contact (Appendix A). A standard set of open-ended basic 
questions was developed that linked directly to the study's research question (Appendix 
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B). Each case study participant answered the same research questions to allow for a 
comparative analysis. 
Data Analysis 
Three methods were used for data analysis: mind mapping, pattern matching, and 
a comparative analysis. Each is discussed separately. 
This research uses mind mapping and is effective for organizing information. The 
objective of mind mapping is to create a picture of each reverse auction (Buzan, 93). A 
comparative analysis between the reverse auctioning case studies identifies factors that 
allow for implementation of the reverse auction. This comparative analysis examines the 
strength of each explanation provided. 
Internal validity is achieved by establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions lead to other conditions (Yin, 1994:33). Matching patterns helps establish the 
inferences from the data collected are correct. Between case pattern matching 
strengthens the internal validity (109-111). In this case, the analytical tactic of pattern 
matching will be used to compare an empirically based pattern with a predicted one. If 
the patterns coincide, the internal validity of this case study is strengthened (106). 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the information gathered and display the 
detailed analysis performed on the three case studies. The cross-case findings will then 
be compared to a fourth case to see if the cross-case findings are supported. The 
objective is to determine whether the reverse auction technique should be broadened and 
to provide guidance. This chapter is divided into three main sections. First, an overview 
of each case study is presented as it correlates to the investigative questions together with 
the development of a mind map. Second, a comparison of the case studies is conducted 
using comparative analysis and pattern matching. This helps to identify the factors that 
allow implementation of reverse auctioning and evaluate such factors as why a decision 
was taken, how it was implemented, and what was its result. Finally, a fourth case is 
studied to determine if the findings of the first three cases are supportable. 
Case A - Overview 
This reverse auction was conducted to procure 35 collar assemblies for the F-16 
aircraft. The total estimated cost based on historical buys was $145,425.00. The award 
was made to the pre-qualified bidder with the lowest bid of $121,500, a savings of 17%. 
Case A - Mind Map 
A mind map for the research question responses and acquisition documentation is 
shown in Appendix C. The mind map creates a picture that explores all the possibilities 
of this reverse auction. This picture provides a good overview and enables us to visualize 
25 
connections. The mind map has the three research investigative central ideas with each 
idea becoming the nucleus for a new group of ideas. 
Investigative Question 1 
The first central idea explored is the nature of the Department Of Defense (DOD) 
competitive market. 
• A commercial item is any item, other than real property, that is 
customarily used by the general public or other entities for other than 
governmental purposes (FAR). Market research was conducted prior 
to selecting the reverse auction technique and indicated this item is a 
commercial item available in the competitive market. 
• Market research also indicated there are numerous vendors available 
for this item. Three vendors pre-qualified to participate in the reverse 
auction. 
• Although three vendors pre-qualified to participate in the reverse 
auction, only two bidders participated in the actual reverse auction. 
The non-participatory bidder stated the entry price was already too 
low. This entry price, or reserve price, is the reverse auction starting 
price that was set by the Government and stated in the solicitation. 
• Global competition was achieved since one bidder was based in the 
Netherlands. 
Investigative Question 2 
The second central idea explored is the criteria used to award the contract. 
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• The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines best value as the 
expected outcome of an acquisition that provides the greatest overall 
benefit to the requirement. This reverse auction is a best value, price 
performance trade-off that allows for the evaluation of criteria other 
than cost. Vendors submitted a pre-qualification package that 
evaluates factors other than cost such as past performance. This 
process allows the contract to be awarded to the vendor providing the 
best value to the government. 
• Vendors were informed in the solicitation directions that pre- 
qualification was mandatory. The pre-qualified vendors were then 
issued a user identification code and password for entry into the 
reverse auction software mechanism. 
• Vendors were evaluated on past performance and required to show 
they had produced the item within the past three years. 
• One pre-qualified vendor did not participate actively in the reverse 
auction because the starting price was already too low. Again, the 
Government set this reverse auction starting price, reserve price. 
• Award was made to the low, pre-qualified bidder. 
• Award was made as a result of this reverse auction. 
Investigative Question 3 
The final central idea explored is the limitations encountered during the reverse 
auction process. 
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• In order to conduct this reverse auction, some engineering concessions 
were made. Under normal procurement procedures for this item, a 
first article is requested under one Contract Line Item Number (CLIN). 
Another CLIN contains the production quantity requirement, which is 
priced separately from the first article. The reverse auction service 
provider could not accommodate two CLINs.   Therefore, the first 
article requirement was deleted to accommodate one CLIN and 
replaced with stringent pre-qualification requirements such as vendors 
were required to have produced the item within the past three years. 
Additionally, a waiver was processed to allow the deletion of the first 
article requirement. 
• The reverse auction pre-qualification process allows the government to 
restrict those vendors qualified to participate. Vendors were informed 
in the solicitation directions that a pre-qualification was mandatory. 
After pre-qualification, vendors were issued a user identification code 
and password for entry into the reverse auction software mechanism. 
• In this case the reverse auction service provider trained both 
government and vendor pre-qualified bidders. Additionally, the 
reverse auction service provider dealt with other issues such as 
problems with the reverse auction software and connectivity issues. 
• Two government only reverse auction training sessions were 
conducted prior to the real reverse auction. The reverse auction 
service provider trained the pre-qualified vendors on the reverse 
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auction procedures (one-on-one). Following this training period, a 
mock reverse auction was held with all of the participating vendors 
and government personnel. 
•    The government team members participating in the mock auction 
experienced several problems: 
1. One vendor was unable to bid. The cause was not determined even 
after contacting the reverse auction service provider. 
2. One vendor attempted to access the auction during an extended 
period. The vendor was informed that the auction had closed when 
it still had four minutes remaining. 
3. Computer connectivity problems were experienced. There was a 
base wide server failure five minutes prior to starting the reverse 
auction. The vendors were still able to conduct the reverse auction 
without the buyer being able to access the site and get the results. 
The reverse auction service provider, prior to the actual auction dates, was not 
able to address the concerns of the mock auction. The government team members 
participating in the mock auctions recommended numerous software changes to the 
reverse auction service provider. Recommendations were forwarded to HQ AFMC/PKL 
and SAF/AQC who in turn forwarded the recommendations to the reverse auction service 
provider. The service provider, prior to the actual auction dates, could not incorporate 
the recommendations that were requested during the mock auctions. 
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• Government personnel depict the reverse auction process as time 
consuming because they must actively take part in the reverse auction, 
which could take several hours of dedicated participation. 
• Three bidders qualified but only two participated in the reverse 
auction. The non-participatory bidder stated that the entry price was 
too low and therefore they would not be able to bid. 
• One vendor issued a letter of concern stating the Government was 
restricting competition by not allowing them to compete. Although 
engineers approved their pre-qualification package they were unable to 
meet the additional stringent past performance requirements stated in 
the solicitation, which required the vendor to have produced the item 
within the past three years. If a first article requirement had been 
allowed, the vendor would have been able to participate in the 
complete acquisition process. 
• If numerous vendors are participating in the reverse auction and a 
problem arises a call may need placed to each vendor immediately. 
Therefore, the reverse auction process may require additional 
personnel to complete this task. 
Case B - Overview 
This reverse auction was conducted to procure 54 link assemblies for the B-1B. 
The total estimated cost based on historical buys was $207,900.00. The award was made 
to the pre-qualified bidder with the lowest bid of $141,750.00, an estimated savings of 
32%. Case B was from the same procuring office as Case A. There was only a short 
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period between the two auctions and did not allow enough time for "lessons learned" 
from the first reverse auction to be incorporated into the second reverse auction. 
Case B - Mind Map 
A mind map for the research question responses and acquisition documentation is 
shown at Appendix D. 
Investigative Question 1 
The first central idea explored is the nature of the DOD competitive market. 
• Market research was conducted prior to selecting the reverse auction 
technique. Market research indicates that this item is a commercial 
item available in the competitive market. 
• Market research indicates that there are numerous vendors available 
for this item. Three vendors pre- qualified to participate in the reverse 
auction. 
• Although three vendors pre-qualified to participate in the reverse 
auction, only two bidders participated in the actual auction. Again, the 
non-participatory bidder stated that the entry price was already too 
low. 
Investigative Question 2 
The second central idea explored is the criteria used to award the contract. 
•    This reverse auction is a best value, price performance trade-off that allows 
for the evaluation of criteria other than cost. Vendors were required to submit 
the following: 
a.   Contract Number; 
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b. Name and address of procuring contracting officer and buyer; 
c. Name and address of cognizant administrative contracting officer; 
d. Number of modifications extending delivery date and reason delivery 
date was extended, e.g., change in government requirements, etc.; 
e. Statement regarding any problems encountered in performing the 
contact. 
This information, together with information received from other sources, allowed the 
government to access present and past performance so a performance risk rating could be 
assigned to each offeror's proposal. This process allows the contract to be awarded to the 
vendor that provides the best value to the government. 
• Vendors were informed in the solicitation directions that pre- 
qualification was mandatory. The pre-qualified vendors were then 
issued a user identification code and password for entry into the 
reverse auction software mechanism. 
• Award was made to the low, pre-qualified bidder. 
• One vendor submitted a local protest stating they submitted a bid prior 
to closing but it was not accepted due to computer sluggishness. 
Therefore, the reverse auction results were not used. Instead, the 
solicitation allowed the government to request a final proposal revision 
and, therefore, vendors submitted their final bid via mail. In the end, 
award was made to the low, pre-qualified bidder using the final 
proposal revision. 
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Investigative Question 3 
The final central idea explored is the limitations encountered during the reverse 
auction process. 
•    In order to conduct a reverse auction, some engineering concessions 
were made. Again, the reverse auction service provider is unable to 
accommodate a reverse auction with multiple CLINs. Under normal 
procurement procedures for this item, a first article is requested under 
one CLIN prior to the production quantity, which is priced separately 
under another CLIN. Therefore, the first article requirement was 
deleted to accommodate one CLIN and replaced with stringent pre- 
qualification requirements. The requiring engineers agreed to waive 
the first article requirement under specific conditions. First, the 
vendors had to submit pre-qualification packages for engineering 
evaluation purposes. Second, if the engineers accepted the pre- 
qualification package and could ascertain recent production quality, 
then the vendors would be allowed to participate in that particular 
acquisition. Lastly, with the waiving of the first article requirement, 
the contractor was required to comply with the International 
Organization of Standardizations (ISO), which promote the 
development of international standards and facilitate the exchange of 
goods and services worldwide. ISO 9002 was incorporated into the 
contract and is applicable to companies that produce and distribute 
their products or services (ISO Easy, 2002). 
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• The reverse auction pre-qualification process allows the government to 
restrict those vendors qualified to participate. Vendors were informed 
in the solicitation directions that a pre-qualification was mandatory. 
• In this case the reverse auction service provider trained both 
government and pre-qualified bidders. 
• Two government only reverse auction training sessions were 
conducted prior to the reverse auctions. Software concerns and 
recommendations were provided to the reverse auction service 
provider. The service provider gave pre-qualified vendors training 
(one-on-one) of system usage. Following this training period, a mock 
reverse auction was held with all of the participating vendors and the 
buyer. 
• This reverse auction could not sustain a protest. The Procuring 
Contracting Officer (PCO) received a local protest. The protest 
complained that lag time between each bid, due to computer 
sluggishness, was unacceptable because they were not able to submit 
their final bid. The continual need to "refresh" the screen, to ensure 
the latest bid was visible, took substantially longer than "real time". 
Following are the issues identified by the participating reverse auction 
vendor: 
1. The auction site from Frictionless, the reverse auction 
service provider, did not function as represented within the 
demonstration/trial auction. During the trial auction the "Refresh 
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Bid History" brought up an automatically updated window (that 
refreshed every 5 seconds). This did not happen during the live 
auction, making the bidder manually refresh the screen, which took 
from 10 seconds to over 3 minutes. 
2. The speed of the auction site was sluggish. The vendor 
states they have a T- internet connection to allow extremely fast 
connection to the Internet. The processing/reply time from this 
reverse auction site was comparable to a Dial-up connection. The 
vendor claims the reverse auction service provider does not have 
sufficient throughput being delivered from the auction provider. 
This is not tolerable when dealing with live real-time transactions. 
3. The total cycle time from making a bid to being able to 
return back to the auction page for the item was never less than 2 
minutes. 
4. The reverse auction clock counted down to zero and 
notified the vendor the auction closed and they appeared to hold 
the lowest bid. However, another bidder put in another bid (which 
was not posted or visible until screen was updated again). The 
vendor was unable to respond to another vendor's lower bid. This 
is because the time is not actually live, but gets its update from the 
screen refresh and then begins to count down. 
The concerns were looked into and the following conclusions were made 
by the PCO: 
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1. Vendor claims that the auction did not operate as it did during the mock 
reverse auction. The reverse auction service provider (Frictionless) stated 
that the screen did not change materially in functionality or appearance 
from the demonstration auction; however, the software provider did not 
dispute the vendor's claim that the duration for refresh took 10 second to 
over 3 minutes. Because no government personnel were present during 
the demonstration this claim could not be verified. 
2. The reverse auction service provider admits (in writing) that the site was 
performing slower than usual once the auction started.   The PCO was 
under the impression the reverse auction was supposed to be live real- 
time, which did not happen. 
3. The reverse auction service provider admits of inconsistencies in the way 
that different browsers handle the refresh operation and stated they have 
made modifications to the application to eliminate the possibility of this 
happening again, regardless of the browser. It was concluded that this was 
a problem during the auction and now the reverse auction service provider 
has taken action to correct it. Therefore, the PCO determined that the 
reverse auction results would not be used and a request for final proposal 
revisions was obtained via paper methods. 
•    The actual cost savings that may appear to be the result of a reverse 
auction may not be the case. The full acquisition cycle needs to be 
evaluated to include reverse auction training that requires personnel 
resources, cost of processing waivers, and the cost of protests received. 
36 
Case C - Overview 
This reverse auction procurement was for a seventy-piece tool kit. The toolkits 
include simple hand tools, with two other special tools, a soldering iron with variable 
temperature control and wire strippers. These sustainment tools are used for shop and 
aircraft maintenance. The solicitation was posted on the Electronic Posting System 
(EPS) utilizing a combination Synopsis/Solicitation method allowed by the FAR. Four 
vendors submitted the required data. 
Case C - Mind Map 
A mind map for the research question responses and acquisition documentation is 
shown in Appendix E 
Investigative Question 1 
The first central idea explored is the nature of the DOD competitive market. 
• Market research indicates that there are numerous vendors available 
for this item. A solicitation notice was posted on 20 November 2000 
with responses and requirement information due by 1 December 2000. 
Five vendors submitted data submissions for qualification to 
participate in the reverse auction. The reverse auction was held on 6 
December 2000 with award made on 12 January 2001. 
• Although five vendors submitted data submissions, only one bidder 
participated in the reverse auction The reason for this was contributed 
(by the buyer) to the short delivery requirement, which was not 
identified during market research. 
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• To be technically acceptable, the items offered had to be acceptable for 
the governments intended use as stated in the solicitation acceptance 
criteria. 
• The reverse auction requirement description was not adequate. 
Therefore, the solicitation was amended to add salient characteristics 
retrieved from the Fed Log. This was accomplished for each of the 
seventy tools, adding the acceptable brand names and part numbers. 
Investigative Question 2 
The second central idea explored is the criteria used to award the contract. 
• Vendors were informed in the solicitation directions that a pre- 
qualification was mandatory. The pre-qualification required vendors 
to meet technical and past performance criteria. 
• Past performance criteria requires the vendors to submit references and 
list related work performed. This allowed the government to 
discriminate against vendors and award to someone other than the low 
bidder. 
• Award was made to the low, pre-qualified bidder. 
• Award was made as a result of this reverse auction. 
Investigative Question 3 
The final central idea explored is the limitations encountered during the reverse 
auction process. 
• There was no guidance or established policies available. This 
opportunity allowed the procuring personnel to simplify the process 
38 
from its creation. Appendix G shows the special reverse auction 
instructions and agreements that were developed and incorporated into 
the solicitation and follow-on contract. 
• The solicitation delivery time requirement was 14 days after receipt of 
the award. Although this was clearly stated in the solicitation only one 
contractor made their concern known, about the short delivery, prior to 
the reverse auction. Because the end user desperately needed these 
tool kits, the reverse auction was conducted with hopes that at least 
one contractor would participate in the reverse auction. 
• In this case the reverse auction service provider trained both 
government and vendor pre-qualified bidders. The education process 
took about 10 minutes for each vendor and was conducted by the 
reverse auction service provider. Many revisions were made prior to 
the actual action starting, and vendors were continually updated to 
assure they were thoroughly educated prior to the reverse auction start 
time. 
• Five bidders qualified but only one participated in the reverse auction 
The starting price was too low for the small businesses to make profit 
on the contract. 
• The actual cost savings that may appear to be the result of a reverse 
auction may not be the case. The full acquisition cycle needs to be 
evaluated to include reverse auction training that requires personnel 
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resources, cost of processing waivers, and the cost of the service 
provider. 
The second part of this chapter conducts a comparative analysis and identifies 
similar factors between each case. 
Pattern-Matching 
Table 4 provides a list of factors identified in this research and correlates the 
factors to the research areas as follows: 
Investigative Area 1: What is the nature of the DOD competitive market when 
using reverse auctioning? 
Investigative Area 2: Can the Air Force use reverse auctions for other than low 
price, information technology? 
Investigative Area 3: What are the primary limitations of the reverse auction 
process? 
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Research Area Case A Case B CaseC 
1 X X X 
1 X 
1 X X X 
1 X X 
1 X X X 
1,3 X X X 
1 X X X 
1 X X X 
2 X X 
2 X X X 
2 X X 
2 X X X 
2,3 X X X 
2 X X 
2 X X X 
2 X X 
2,3 X 
3 X X X 
3 X X 
3 X X X 
3 X X X 
Commercially Available 
Global Competition Received 
Numerous Vendors 
Received Competition 
Firm Fixed Price 
Full Service Software Provider 
Pre-qualification Required 
Market Research Conducted 
RA Award 
Low Bid 
Higher Level Inspection 
Past Performance 
Pre-qualification 
Best Value (PPT) 
Technical Criteria 
100% SB Set-aside 
Protested 
Time Consuming 
No Control over Connectivity 
Training - Government 
Training - Vendors 
Table 4: Pattern Matching 
Comparative Analysis 
• Each case studied was for the procurement of a commercial item. This indicates 
reverse auctioning should be used to buy items readily available in the 
marketplace and supports the theory that reverse auctions should be used for 
commercial items. 
• Global competition was received in one of the three cases. This supports the 
theory that e-commerce is working to reach a larger, global supplier database. 
• Numerous vendors indicated interest in participating in each of the three cases 
studied. 
• Competition was received in only two of the three cases. This indicates that 
preliminary market research should be more complete. Expected delivery terms, 
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and any unique requirements should be exposed prior to solicitation issuance. 
Additionally, the Government should not set the opening bid price and allow the 
market to drive the price. 
• All three cases were awarded on a firm fixed pricing arrangement. 
• All three cases used a full-service reverse auction provider. Each provider had 
software and hardware problems. 
• In each case the vendor had pre-qualification terms that had to be met prior to the 
reverse auction. This supports the theory that reverse auctions can be used to 
procure items that include award criteria other than low price alone. 
• Award was made using the results of the reverse auction in only two of the three 
cases studied. 
• In each case award was made to the low, pre-qualified bidder. 
• Past performance standards were required in each case. 
Conclusions of Cross-Case Analysis 
Two areas were identified as critical to the reverse auction process. First, organizations 
should assure the reverse auction service provider can support the reverse auction 
process. Second, complete market research must be accomplished to provide accurate 
information. 
It is critical that the proper reverse auction service provider is selected. Problems 
experienced in each case study were a direct result of the reverse auction service 
provider. In Case B the reverse auction results were not used due to the problems 
experienced as a direct result of the reverse auction service provider. In general, reverse 
auction service providers were unable to conduct the reverse auctions in real time without 
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delays and were unable to accommodate multiple bidding formats. Most agencies do not 
have the technical expertise to conduct their own auction and rely on a full service 
reverse auction enabler. To avoid problems with reverse auction provider's, 
organizations should consider the track record of the enabler; the technology used and its 
flexibility and their contingency plan for technical or other difficulties. 
A complete investigation of the market should be made during the market 
research phase. Vendors must be notified of unique requirements and short delivery 
schedules. If they do not know the conditions of the buy-in they may not be willing to 
participate in the end. Additionally, the Government should not set a "reserve" price and 
allow the market to drive the price downward by the participating vendors. 
To increase the external validity of this research a fourth case was studied and the 
findings were compared to the cross-case analysis of the first three cases. 
Commercially Available 
Numerous Vendors 
Firm Fixed Price 
Full Service Software Provider 
Pre-qualification Required 





Training - Government 
Training - Vendors 
Table 5: Comparative Pattern Matching 
Research Area Case A Case B CaseC Case D 
1 X X X X 
1 X X X X 
1 X X X X 
1,3 X X X X 
1,2,3 X X X X 
1 X X X X 
2 X X X X 
2 X X X X 
2 X X X X 
3 X X X X 
3 X X X X 
3 X X X X 
Case D - Overview 
This reverse auction was conducted to procure environmental control systems test 
sets for the F-15 aircraft. CLIN 0001AA was for two first articles test units and CLIN 
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0001 AB was for the follow-on production units. Due to funding uncertainties, vendors 
proposed production quantities in three increments. Increment A was for the quantity 34- 
44. Increment B was for the quantity 45-55. Increment C was for the quantity of 56-68. 
The second CLIN was for data and CLIN 0003 was an option to procure four circuit card 
assemblies. This item had never been produced in quantity so a historical price was not 
available. The government reported savings of 50% over their market research estimate. 
Case D - Analysis and Findings 
A mind map for the research question responses and acquisition documentation is 
shown in Appendix F. The cross case analysis findings are compared to the findings of 
this Case D. 
The first central idea explored is the nature of the DOD competitive market. 
• Cases A-C found that reverse auctions should be conducted for 
procurement of commercial items available in the competitive market. 
Case D supports this finding, as this reverse auction was also for 
commercial items available in the competitive market. 
• In cases A-C, more competition was anticipated than received. Case D 
supports this as market research indicated 11 vendors were planning 
on taking part in the reverse auction. However, only four vendors 
submitted bids during the reverse auction. 
• Case D supports the theory provided by cases A-C, reverse auctions 
can be conducted to procure firm fixed price contracts. 
• All four cases used a full-service provider. However, each reverse 
auction service provider encountered software and hardware problems. 
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• In each case the vendor had pre-qualification terms that had to be met 
prior to the reverse auction. This indicates that reverse auctions can be 
used to procure items and include award criteria other than price alone. 
The second central idea explored is the criteria used to award the contract. 
• In each case, pre-qualifications were required prior to the reverse 
auction, which allowed the government to restrict vendors based on 
technical criteria, and past performance. 
• Market research revealed there are at least two small businesses that 
will participate. Therefore, this procurement was 100% set-aside for a 
small business award. 
• In this Case D, the procurement required a first article prior to 
producing the production amount. The reverse auction service 
provider could handle multiple contract line item numbers to allow for 
both a first article and production. The reverse auction service 
provider could not do this in Cases A & B. 
• In all cases, award was made to the low, pre-qualified bidder. 
• Award was made as a result of this reverse auction. 
The final central idea explored is limitations encountered during the reverse 
auction process. 
• The reverse auction service provider plays many critical roles in the 
reverse auction process. In this case the service provider trained both 
government and vendor pre-qualified bidders. Additionally, the 
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service provider deals with other issues such as problems with the 
reverse auction software and connectivity issues. 
• Training was first given to government acquisition personnel followed 
by training for those vendors that qualified technically. 
• The reverse auction process cannot sustain a protest. Several offerers 
complained they had problem timing out when placing bids. This was 
the result of the clock freezing on the screen when they entered the 
area to type in the bid. Two offerers complained during the auction 
and, therefore, the auction was reset and continued until finished. 
• The solicitation required development of two special clauses, 
Instruction, Conditions and Notices to offerors and the other entitled 
Basis for Contract Award. 
• There is limited participation from vendors that do not want to 
participate in a reverse auction. Therefore, maximum competition 
may not be received. 
Conclusions of Case D Cross Case Analysis 
It is critical that the proper reverse auction service provider is selected. Problems 
experienced in each case study were a direct result of the reverse auction service 
provider. In one case the reverse auction results were not used due to the problems 
experienced as a result of the reverse auction software. Reverse auction service providers 
were unable to conduct the auction in real time without delays and were unable to 
accommodate multiple bidding formats. This supports the theory that when selecting a 
reverse auction provider, organizations should consider the track record of the enabler; 
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the technology used and its flexibility and a contingency plan for technical or other 
difficulties. 
Vendors must be notified of unique requirements such as short delivery schedules. 
In order to maximize competition, the Government should stop setting a reverse auction 
reserve price and let the market drive the price. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions based on the analysis 
conducted in Chapter IV. Each investigative area question is answered, followed by 
conclusions and recommendations. Then, the limitations of the research are presented 
together with potential topics for future research. 
Investigative Area 1: What is the nature of the Department Of Defense competitive 
market when using reverse auctioning? 
In each case, market research analysis was conducted to study practices in the 
particular market segment. All four case studies provide a clearly defined requirement, 
available from at least two competent vendors in the commercial, competitive 
marketplace. This factor leads to the question of why did vendors say they would 
participate in the reverse auction process but then did not? 
In each case, the government anticipates more competition than received. In one 
of the four reverse auctions only one vendor participated. During the market research 
phase the buying activity received "buy- in" from the vendors but did not identify all 
critical information for making an informed decision about whether to participate in the 
reverse auction or not such as: 
Short delivery period 
Starting bid price 
Pre-qualifications 
The Air Force should continue analyzing the standard practices of the particular 
market segment before determining to use a reverse auction. During the market research 
phase, delivery requirements, pre-qualification requirements, and any other unique 
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criteria should be revealed. This will allow vendors to access their competitiveness 
before committing a lot of time and effort. Eliminating the "reserve" price set by the 
Government will allow the vendors to start the reverse auction price and drive it 
downward, maximizing competition. 
Investigative Area 2: Can we use reverse auctions for other than low price, 
Information Technology (IT)? 
In each case the Air Force was able to consider criteria other than low price. Each 
case effectively stated criteria such as past performance and technical requirements that 
enabled the Air Force to limit the participation in the reverse auction to vendors that met 
the pre-qualification requirements. 
It is recommended that the Air Force continue using reverse auctioning for 
procurements that have award criteria other than low price. However, assurances must be 
made that pre-qualifications are not too restrictive, thereby eliminating competition and 
creating a potential protest. 
The conclusion of this research is that reverse auctioning can be used to award 
contracts with award criteria other than low price. The Air Force successfully awarded 
contracts from Case A, Case C, and Case D. Case B was not awarded from the reverse 
auction results but its failure was not due to the award criteria. 
Investigative Area 3: What are the primary limitations of the reverse auction 
process? 
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There are numerous limitations in the reverse auction process as identified in each 
case study. Two primary limitations found in each case include the effectiveness of the 
reverse auction service provider and the "reserve" starting price for the reverse auction. 
Organizations must consider the following when selecting a reverse auction 
provider: 
a. The track record of the enabler, which should include number of 
current and past clients; volume of business; and customer satisfaction 
to include past performance to determine if they can provide what they 
say they can; 
b. The technology used, its flexibility, and; 
c. Reverse auction service provider's contingency plan for technical or 
other difficulties. 
Vendors must be notified of unique requirements prior to receiving their buy-in. 
During market research, organizations should identify any unique requirements involved 
such as quick delivery. Also, organizations need to let the market drive the price of the 
reverse auction and eliminate the starting price of the auction set by the Government. 
Lessons Learned 
In one case, the first article test requirement was deleted and replaced with 
compliance to International Organization of Standardization, ISO 9002, which promotes 
the development of international standards to facilitate the exchange of goods and 
services worldwide. This is a good step toward true utilization of commercial procedures 
versus unique military specifications and first article requirements. 
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In one case, the solicitation was set up to anticipate problems with the reverse 
auction process. Therefore, award could be made from the reverse auction process or the 
second alternative was to discard the reverse auction results and request vendor's final 
proposal revisions via mail. 
Final Recommendation 
It is recommended that the Air Force ensure that the reverse auction service 
provider can provide adequate service to successfully conduct the auction. This should 
allow the Air Force to use the reverse auctioning process without fear of receiving a 
protest from vendors due to faulty software. To accomplish this may require a source 
selection for a single USAF service provider, which will allow the Air Force to select one 
vendor that can provide the most efficient and effective reverse auction services. 
Additionally, it is recommended that the Air Force should eliminate the use of a 
starting reverse auction price. In each case, this "reserve" price was set by the 
Government and limited participation. Deletion of this starting bid price should 
maximize participation and will allow the market to drive the price. 
Vendors were evaluated on past performance and required to show they had 
produced the item within the past three years. The Government must have a valid reason 
to restrict this procurement to vendors that have produced the item within the past three 
years. If there is no specific reason for this requirement, it is protestable. This is 
evidenced by a letter of concern from one pre-qualified vendor that did not meet the 
additional stringent past performance requirement. The letter of concern states the 
Government was restricting competition by not allowing them to compete. With the use 
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of commercial practices such as ISO standards, the vendor would have been able to 
participate in the complete acquisition process. 
Research Limitations 
The Air Force has only used reverse auctioning to conduct four procurements for 
other than Information Technology (IT). This small number of reverse auctions limits the 
researchers ability to match patterns of more reverse auctions. 
IT reverse auctions were not studied in this research effort. Therefore, the 
findings from to IT reverse auctions could not be compared to the findings of this 
research. 
The characterization of a "successful" reverse auction was not defined. The 
definition can vary depending on the perceptions of the vendors and the Government. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The Air Force should study the reported reverse auction savings and determine if 
all costs were considered. The additional costs that need to be measured are the 
manpower resources utilized in receiving reverse auction training; the cost of the reverse 
auction provider, and the cost of limited participants. 
The Air Force should examine existing reverse auction service providers to 
determine if software should be developed for Government usage. Currently, each 
government office is responsible for obtaining the reverse auction service provider. This 
is risky as was experienced in each case of this research. Some providers claim to have a 
successful reverse auction system in place but fail to perform adequately during the 
actual action when all players are involved. A source selection to select a single enabler 
52 
would provide the Air Force with a tool to use by each office and should eliminate the 
need for continual reverse auctioning training. 
Study Air Force Information Technology reverse auctions and compare the results 
of these auctions to the results of this research. 
Reverse auctions may damage buyer-supplier relationships with the Government. 
It is recommended that additional research be conducted to find out if the participating 
vendors felt exploited by the reverse auction process and study how the reverse auctions 
affect the DOD industrial supplier base. 
Study the definition of a "successful" reverse auction from the Government and 
vendor's perspective. 
53 
Appendix A: Initial Contact with Primary Point Of Contacts 
 Original Message  
From: Marion Cynthia L CIV AFIT/ENV rmailto:Cvnthia.MarionfS.afit.edul 
Sent: Tuesday, August 07,2001 10:26 AM 
To: WRALC/PKOCA; OO-ALC/PKPQ; WRALC/LFKA 
Subject: Reverse Auctions - Request for Thesis Data 
TO: Buyer, Wright-Patterson AFB OH (58390) 
Buyer, Robin AFB GA (DSN 468-9287) 
Buyer, Robins AFB GA (DSN 486-2477) 
Buyer, Hill AFB UT (DSN 777-7807) 
My name is Cindy Marion and I am a student at the Air Force Institute of 
Technology, Graduate School of Engineering and Management, AFIT/ENV, Wright- 
Patterson AFB OH. My e-mail address is: Cynthia.Marion@afit.edu I am working 
on my thesis entitled Reverse Auctioning. My sponsor is AFMC/PKO, 
Lt Col (S) Steve Elliott. He provided your name as a possible point of contact to 
assist me in my thesis research. 
Will you be able and willing to assist me in providing data? Specifically, answering 
some general questions about the Reverse Auctioning process that you accomplished 
and going through the contract file and providing documents such as the market 
research, RFP, contract, possible protests, and any unique information/documents that 
was related to your reverse auction, etc. 
Please let me know as soon as possible if you can help via response to this e-mail. 
Additionally, if you can help, please provide the aforementioned materials either via 
e-mail or send to: 
AFIT/ENV 
Graduate School of Engineering & Management 
ATTN: Cindy Marion, Student 
Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433 
My timeline: I will contact you for a short interview via telephone or you may 
complete the questions (I am still developing) and e-mail your response back to me. I 
expect to contact you and complete the questions around the end of September or 
toward to beginning of October. I can provide the questions earlier if this would be 
more convenient. 
Thank you for your time! 
Again, please let me know if I can count on you to provide data for my thesis. 
Cindy Marion, AFIT/ENV 
Wright-Patterson AFB OH 
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Appendix B: Investigative Questions 
Investigative Area 1 
What is the nature of the DOD competitive market when using reverse 
auctioning? The intent of this question is to identify the characteristics of a competitive 
market and determine what type of buyer-supplier relationship exists. 
1. How is the nature of the DOD competitive market affected by reverse 
auctioning? 
2. How does reverse auctioning affect the type of supplier relationship 
that is involved with the item being procured and what type of 
relationship is needed? 
3. How does reverse auctioning affect the DOD industrial base? 
4. How did you determine if your reverse auction was to be restricted and 
did you have any problems? 
Investigative Area 2 
Can we use reverse auctions for other than low price, information technology? 
The intent of this question is to determine what factors, other than low price, can be 
considered for award criteria of a reverse auction. 
5. What are the award criteria and why was it selected? 
Investigative Area 3 
What are the primary limitations of the reverse auction process? The intent of this 
question is to identify factors that limit the usefulness of a reverse auction. 
6. Did you develop any special contract clauses for your reverse auction, 
and, if so, what were they? 
7. How was the selection of the reverse auction service provider made? 
8. What were the primary limitations of the reverse auction process? 
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Appendix C: Case A Open Coded Mind Map 
Global Vendor Qualifies Pfe-qualification 











' Computer Connectivity Problem 
Bid Process Is Time Consuming 
Auction May Require Additional Personnel 
waiver 
Higher Level Inspection 
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Appendix D: Case B Open Coded Mind Map 
RA Thrown Out 








igher Level Inspection 
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Appendix E: Case C Open Coded Mind Map 




Bid Process Is Time Consuming 
Dre-qualification 
No Established Guidance 
Appendix F: Case D Open Coded Mind Map 
Commercially Available 
Technical Evaluation RA Award 
■Pre-qualification 







Appendix G: Reverse Auction Instructions and Agreement 
1. WR-ALC at Robins AFB will conduct a competitive, anonymous, on-line reverse 
auction for. WR-ALC has teamed with the US Army Communications and Electronics 
Command (CECOM) to conduct the reverse auction for this requirement. The URL for 
the reverse auction is http ://abop.monmouth.army.mil. Interested parties shall contact the 
Contracting Office at Robins AFB to receive a username and password for the reverse 
auction. 
2. If a participant would like a demonstration of the reverse auctioning tool, contact this 
office at least one week prior to commencement of the auction. All signed documents 
required by this action shall be sent to this office by fax or by email. (Electronically 
signed documents shall be readable in MS Word or Adobe PDF format.) 
3. Proposal submission. This acquisition will be made by reverse auction procedures. 
Only sources whose offers are determined to be technically acceptable may participate in 
the reverse auction. Participants will use the reverse auctioning tool developed by 
CECOM currently in a pilot phase. This is a competitive, anonymous, on-line auction in 
which participants will submit a series of bids that descend in price. By participating in 
this reverse auction you grant the government the right to disclose your prices, however 
your name will be kept ano nymous. 
Procedures for the auction: 
4. At 1:30pm EST on 06Dec00 the auction shall commence and at 2:30pm EST the 
auction shall close unless an extension is given. The Army site server clock identifies the 
"Approx. Time of Close". The system will automatically extend the closing time should 
a bid be placed within the last five minutes of the auction. Further, if an extension period 
is generated and a quote is submitted at any time within the extension period, another five 
minutes extension period will be generated, otherwise the reverse auction will close. 
There will be no limits on the number of extensions in this reverse auction. 
5. During the reverse auction, contractors may bid as often as they want, but shall bid 
only on the total quantity of 100 Kits. Prices entered on the web site shall be for unit 
prices only. Contractors are not required to revise their prices during the reverse auction. 
Contractor's quotes must differ from the market-leading quote by at least the decrement 
identified in the "Auction Details" at the Reverse Auction web site.   Ensure you 
complete all required blanks on the web site prior to submitting a quote, and check the 
appropriate boxes. Contractors will submit revised pricing only through the online web 
site specified above during the reverse auction. Contracting Officer will not accept 
revised pricing via any other mechanism including but not limited to post, courier, fax, e- 
mail, or orally unless specifically requested by the contracting officer. Once the reverse 
auction is complete, all contractors shall submit a signed copy of their price quote to the 
point of contact above. 
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6. The Contracting Officer reserves the right to make no award under this procedure. The 
contracting officer also reserves the right to suspend or cancel the reverse auction at any 
time. If the contracting officer cancels the reverse auction, the order may be processed 
using normal procedures. 
7. By participating in the reverse auction, contractors certify they will not knowingly 
disclosure their prices to any other quoter except anonymously during the on- line reverse 
auction. The Contractor further certifies that anonymous disclosure of its prices during 
the reverse auction shall not be for the purposes of restricting competition. 
8. Contractors are required to sign the SF 1449 and return to this office prior to receiving 
a user ID and Logon password. By signing this document, contractors agree to abide by 
the terms of this reverse auction agreement. 
9. Provide the name of the individual who will represent your company during the 
reverse auction. 
(insert name and phone number) 
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